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A recent opinion article published
in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
(Osiurak, 2013) points out several chal-
lenges of the study of “affordances” related
to investigations of apraxia. In 2010,
we published in Frontiers a review and
theoretical proposal that addresses our
concerns about affordances and grounded
cognition (Mizelle and Wheaton, 2010b).
Central to our premise was the argu-
ment that, for tool use, action goals
were the grounded invariant elements as
opposed to the action representations of
the tools themselves. Further, parameters
of the behavior(s) undertaken to achieve
the action goal (tool used to accomplish
the task, usage context of the tool, and the
motor variables to accomplish the task)
are affording to the goal, inherently vari-
able, but are driven by the fixed action
goal itself. Our model (Modular Selection
for Action Goals, MSAG) incorporates the
idea that stored representational knowl-
edge of tools can be broadly adapted by
usage context so that action goals can be
achieved, emphasizing the adaptability of
tool contextual and usage representations
and the fixedness of the overall action
goal. In commentary to our MSAGmodel,
Pellicano et al. (2011) considered an alter-
native view where affordances (stable and
variable) function to align tools to action
goals. The core difference is that Pellicano
and colleagues proposed that potentiation
of tool-action goal alignment is medi-
ated by affordances (certain properties of
tools). We proposed that the fulfillment of
the action goal defines affording proper-
ties of any possible combination of tools
and motor variables, where some combi-
nations are more or less affording to the
action goal than others. At any rate, we
certainly agree that further studies need
to be considered to appreciate and refine
specifics of any models, whether ours or
those of Pellicano and colleagues.
While Osiurak emphasized the alterna-
tive commentary (Pellicano et al., 2011),
we feel it is worth noting that many of the
ideas presented by Osiurak (2013) reflect
core concepts of our 2010 MSAG theory.
For example, in Figure 2 of the MSAG
proposal paper (Mizelle and Wheaton,
2010b), selection of alternative tools when
the canonical tool is not available (we
use the example of tools within a reason-
able workspace) is not necessarily driven
by a broad range of stable affordances
(the adaptive grounded view). Rather, an
alternative tool is selected based on the
properties which best allow for the accom-
plishment of the action goal based on
known mechanical/functional properties
of tools. This embodies the first two
assumptions of Osiurak (2013). Under
MSAG, interconnected modules are trig-
gered by an action goal that afford seman-
tic flexibility of tools; tool (selection),
usage context (refinement, as tools have
multiple uses), and neurobiomechanics
(motor specifics).
Further, our contention has been that
the elements that best fulfill the action
goal become the relevant affordances for
tool selection and motor performance,
not necessarily the “grounded” or sta-
ble affording properties of tools. This
embodies the third assumption presented
by Osiurak. The action goal defines the
cooperatively determined usage context of
the tool. Chiefly, this allows for creativ-
ity and adaptability in how action goals
are accomplished, especially when canon-
ical tools—those with grounded action
representations coincident with the action
goal—are not available.
Work in our lab has sought to under-
stand how people “connect” tools and
objects for action goals. Using electroen-
cephalography (EEG), we have suggested
that erroneous tool-object pairings gen-
erates ventral activation, which seems
to precede parietofrontal activation typ-
ical of tool-object encoding for action
(Mizelle and Wheaton, 2010a,c). Further,
in a multimodal neuroimaging study, we
used EEG and functional MRI (fMRI)
to propose that contextual understand-
ing of incorrect/impossible actions (via
ventral pathways) precedes the activity of
correct/possible actions (via parietofrontal
pathways) that may suggest how both con-
ceptual and ideomotor type apraxias could
occur (Mizelle and Wheaton, 2010d).
Indeed, this was reflected in MSAG as
we proposed that ventral damage could
corrupt the ability to align a tool with
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the action goal and the canonical usage
context of that tool. In this case, a fail-
ure to deselect inappropriate tools would
result, but the inappropriate tool would
be used in motor-relevant ways in an
attempt to achieve the desired behav-
ior. It is our proposal that such ventral
pathway damage could help distinguish
clinico-anatomical correlates of motor ver-
sus conceptual apraxias.
Core to the goals of this Research Topic
(“Bridging the theories of offordances and
limb apraxia”), what does MSAG have to
do with apraxia? We have had interest in
focusing MSAG on the conceptual level,
to better understand neural circuits that
could be vulnerable in persons with con-
ceptual apraxias. We have recently refined
the MSAG proposal, suggesting that the
dorsal parietofrontal areas encode possi-
ble “functional affordance,” where quali-
ties of seen (or desired) actions of tools
are encoded based on relevance to behav-
iors for achievement of an action plan
(Mizelle et al., 2013). In this work, we
chose tool-object pairs that were always
correct/possible to fulfill an action goal,
but modified the functional affordance
by changing how the tool interacted
with the object. When functional affor-
dance is high (correct tool-object pairs
are used correctly) parietofrontal activa-
tion is dominant. Yet, when functional
affordance is low (correct tool-object pairs
used incorrectly), ventral brain areas show
significant activations. Thus, functional
affordance may be similarly driven, at least
in part, by the mechanical/physical align-
ment (Mizelle et al., 2013) and contextual-
ization (Mizelle and Wheaton, 2010a,d) of
tool-object pairs. This helps to underscore
a common problem in conceptual apraxia,
where tool selection for a task is impacted.
If ventral networks are largely affected,
conceptual errors can become predomi-
nant, yet the MSAG model does not stop
there.
As MSAG predicts, successful fulfill-
ment of the action goal is paramount and
a certain amount of inherent flexibility
exists to accomplish the goal. As we pro-
posed in MSAG, accomplishing the goal
without ending in a fault is of primary
concern. MSAG proposes a preliminary
framework of how both conceptual and
motor “faults” may occur, which would
reflect conceptual and ideomotor apraxias.
While many of our studies have focused
on the conceptual errors, we are contin-
uing work on expansion into the motoric
domain, and the interactions between con-
ceptual andmotor properties of action.We
anticipate that such refinement will be a
pivotal step in being able to better detail
the neural systems involved in apraxia.
We are continuing to study how we
encode and understand action goals,
which is core to shaping MSAG and highly
relevant to the opinion article by Ousirak.
In the context of goal-based tool use,
our own work suggests that affordances
are complex, possibly dynamic entities.
We propose that research should focus
on the varied properties of affordance
and how these varied properties might
interact. A good place to start would
be seeking to align the various propos-
als of affordance, and their relevance to
apraxia, through collaborative research
efforts.
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